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I. INTRODUCTION
The term "particularism" is encountered only rarely in the law.'
The basic idea of particularism itself is, however, of great importance in
the law. Particularism is, helpfully, much more prominent in
contemporary moral philosophy.2 The opposite of particularism, in
moral philosophy and in law, is usually taken to be "generalism" or
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
The author hereby extends his thanks to Rachel Anne Scherer for her continued advice and counsel.
1. For examples, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 194
(1996) ("General theories do not decide concrete cases, and case-by-case particularism has
advantages over the creation and application of broad rules."); Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and
the Perils of Particularism, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 397, 398 (1989) (reviewing HARRY KALVEN, JR., A
WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988)) [hereinafter Schauer, Perils of
Particularism] (critiquing the common understanding that Harry Kalven was "a particularist, a
devotee of the case-specific methods of the common law, an opponent of grand theory, and a
scholar who saw the key to free speech adjudication not in large categories but in 'thinking small');
and Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 646 (1991)
[hereinafter Schauer, Rules] (contrasting "rule-based decisionmaking, in which a generalization
provides a reason for decision, even in the area of its under- or over-inclusion; and particularistic
decisionmaking, which aims to optimize for each case and treats normative generalizations as only
temporary and transparent approximations of the better results a decisionmaker should try to
reach").
2. The leading exposition of moral particularism is JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT
PRINCIPLES (2004). For book-length edited collections on moral particularism, see CHALLENGING
MORAL PARTICULARISM (Mark Norris Lance et al. eds., 2008) and MORAL PARTICULARISM (Brad
Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little eds., 2000). For a book-length critique of moral particularism, see
SEAN MCKEEVER & MICHAEL RIDGE, PRINCIPLED ETHICS: GENERALISM AS A REGULATIVE IDEAL
(2006). There is substantial article-length literature on the subject; perhaps the most readily
accessible authoritative statement is Jonathan Dancy, Moral Particularism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHIL. (2005), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-particularism.
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
"principlism. ' '3 For the moment, we may think of particularism in the
law as strongly de-emphasizing the roles of principles, rules, standards,
policies, and tests.4 More positively, we may think of particularism in
the law as instead emphasizing vivid and concrete analogies,
hypotheticals, stories, images, instructive fables, parables, particular
incidents, legends and myths, dreams, and similar sorts of narratives.
This Article draws upon the treatments of particularism in recent
moral philosophy scholarship in order to shed light on the proper role of
particularism in the law. We will find below that particularism and
principlism in the law are distinguishable approaches to deciding and
justifying the outcomes of case adjudications. They can be thought of as
alternative approaches, or as different positions on a spectrum of
approaches, to legal decisionmaking Our main conclusion, however,
will be that it is, surprisingly, more important to appreciate how
mutually indispensible particularism and principlism are in the law. The
synergistic 6 effects of particularism and principlism in the law deserve at
least as much attention as their claimed advantages and rivalries.
Probably the best test case for understanding the roles of
particularism and principlism in the law invokes the historical and
continuing struggle over slavery, segregation, discrimination, and civil
rights in general. This vital area of the law, running from the
Abolitionists to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to the present date, allows us
to contrast particularism and principlism, and to see their mutual
dependencies and important synergistic effects.
The synergistic effects and the reciprocal dependence between
particularism and principlism in the law lead us to think of loosely
parallel relationships found in nature.7 This symmetrical dependence
3. See DANCY, supra note 2, at 7; MCKEEVER & RIDGE, supra note 2, at 3, 5; Gilbert
Harman, Moral Particularism and Transduction, 15 PHIL. ISSUES 44, 44 (2005).
4. For elaboration on the meaning of particularism, see infra notes 11-30 and accompanying
text. Most pointedly, see infra text accompanying note 28. For a sense of one widely discussed
strand of legal thinking that at least overlaps with legal particularism, see, for example, Kathryn
Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 982 (1991) (examining "feminist
narrative scholarship as a distinctive form of legal argument"). See generally Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Final Chronicle: Cultural Power, the Law Reviews, and the Attack on Narrative
Jurisprudence, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 545 (1995) (showing how the narrative form can be used in legal
analysis); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989) (a collection of articles
addressing the role of narrative in the law).
5. See Schauer, Rules, supra note 1, at 650.
6. For a brief illustration of the narrow biological definitions, as well as broader usages, of
synergy and synergistic effects, see the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 480 (2d ed. 1989).
7. For a parallel brief illustration of the biological, as well as the more extended, uses of the
idea of symbiosis, see id. at 450-51.
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between particularism and principlism in the law may ultimately be
broken,8 in favor of particularism, only at the highest and most abstract
stage9 of comparing particularism and principlism in the law. Otherwise,
the mutual dependence between particularism and principlism seems
important and stable.
As we would expect with a symbiotic relationship in nature, we
shall find that particularism and principlism in the law are often at their
most valuable when fulfilling complementary roles.10 By loose analogy,
we expect children to be able to learn and communicate about addition
most easily through particularism, such as by adding apples, physically,
to other apples in their grasp. But we would be surprised to learn that a
competent adult continued to think of addition only in such
particularized terms. This sort of role differentiation should not,
however, distract us away from the underlying mutual dependencies
upon which both legal particularism and legal principlism rely. Let us
begin to explore some of these themes.
II. MORAL PARTICULARISM AND PARTICULARISM IN THE LAW
Particularism in moral theory is currently "popular."1 Several
leading contemporary moral theorists, including feminist moral theorists,
along with some modern and classical antecedents, 12  have been
described as moral particularists. 13 Not surprisingly, there are different
8. See Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani, Symmetry and Symmetry Breaking, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2008), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/symmetry-breaking
(discussing the narrower core meaning of symmetry-breaking in various physics contexts); see also
IAN STEWART, WHY BEAUTY IS TRUTH: A HISTORY OF SYMMETRY 218 (2007) (discussing
"spontaneous symmetry-breaking" and its effect).
9. Options open for our use at lower levels of abstraction may no longer be realistically open
to us when a debate moves to a higher level of abstraction; in our case, over finally breaking the
symmetry between particularist and principlist emphases in the law. The classic citation on the
loosely related idea of levels of preferences is Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the
Concept of a Person, in HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT:
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 11, 12-13 (1988) (contrasting first- and more abstract second-order
preferences).
10. See in particular the reference to the law of race, infra Part IV.B. Of course, both the
particular and principle may or may not motivate or even inspire us. See infra Part IV.B.
Presumably they may both do so in different ways.
11. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Some Varieties of Particularism, 30 METAPHILOSOPHY 1,
1 (1999).
12. See id. at 1-2 (stating that the doctrine of particularlism spans from Aristotle to present-
day particularists, who have further developed the view that certain moral judgments should not be
based on either general principles or rules).
13. For the possibility of taking a corresponding view in the legal realm, see SUN STEIN, supra
note 1, at 194 ("[C]ase-by-case particularism has advantages over the creation and application of
broad rules."). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1907-
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varieties 14 of moral particularism, with different degrees of ambition of
their claims. 5
"Moral particularism" can thus mean various things. But our
interest in moral particularism is driven by our concern for legal
decisionmaking. Given our interests, we can describe moral
particularism in several related ways, with no deep commitment to any
single formulation. Just to develop the idea, we might say that moral
particularism seeks to justify moral judgments in ways that minimize,
even if they do not entirely eliminate, any reliance on moral principle.' 6
Moral principles, even if they exist, should not guide, inspire, or validate
our particular moral judgments.' 7
In saying even this much, however, we have already raised the
question of what counts as a moral principle, and indirectly what should
count, for our purposes, as a legal principle. Perhaps the legal equivalent
of a moral principle should include not only legal principles in a narrow
sense, but legal standards, rules, policies, and tests as well. This will
depend upon how the idea of moral particularism is worked out.
A moral particularist need not deny that there might be at least one
moral principle, properly defined and limited. The leading contemporary
moral particularist, Professor Jonathan Dancy, instead "sees little if any
role for moral principles."' 18 Dancy thus argues that "moral judgment can
get along perfectly well without any appeal to principles."' 9 This seems
less a denial of the possibility of one or more moral principles 20 than a
claim that the quality of our individual or our collective moral life will
09 (2006) (expressing discontent with Justice O'Conner's "minimalist" jurisprudence and providing
illustrations of particularist decisions).
14. See generally Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 11 (providing the examples of analytic,
metaphysical, epistemological, and methodological particularism).
15. See Harman, supra note 3, at 44.
16. See Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 11, at 2. Particularists may be committed at least to the
single moral rule that one should (morally) choose particularism over principlism in deciding a
moral question.
17. See id.
18. DANCY, supra note 2, at 1.
19. Id.; see also Joseph Raz, The Trouble with Particularism (Dancy's Version), 115 MIND
99, 99 (2006) (reviewing DANCY, supra note 2) (per Dancy, "the possibility of moral thought does
not depend on moral principles"). Dancy suggests "that morality can get along perfectly well
without principles, and that the imposition of principles on an area that doesn't need them is likely
to lead to some sort of distortion." DANCY, supra note 2, at 2. This formulation raises the possibility
of some sort of affirmative harm flowing from recourse to moral principles.
20. But cf Dancy, supra note 2 ("Moral Particularism, at its most trenchant, is the claim that
there are no defensible moral principles, that moral thought does not consist in the application of
moral principles to cases .... ).
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not suffer if we abandon the attempt to identify and apply relevant moral
principles when moral judgments are required of us.
We can roughly define moral principlism, or moral generalism, in
opposing terms. Thus moral principlism holds "either that specific moral
truths have their source in general moral principles, or that reasonable or
justified moral decisions and beliefs are based on the acceptance of
general moral principles. Moral particularism rejects moral
generalism." 21 Given our interest in legal decisionmaking, we will be
especially interested in how moral particularists make decisions-what
we might call moral adjudications-as "[w]ithout principles, [a
particularist] needs a robust theory of judgment. ' 22
On this crucial point of how moral judgments are to be made
without reliance on moral rules, the particularists can offer some degree
of clarification. Ultimately, the particularist often may be relying on a
form of intuitionism. z3 In turn, an intuition is thought of as a moral
judgment that does not follow logically from any set of premises the
intuitionist holds and cannot be thus demonstrated to be true.24 The
intuition is still thought of as somehow true, self-evident, and the result
of properly attending to the morally relevant features of the situation.
The intuition upon which the particularist relies may be
supplemented, if not prompted, by a number of devices and techniques
that may not rely on moral principle. The moral particularist-like a
legal particularist-can appeal to vivid and concrete images, specific
analogies and analogous cases, fictional or hypothetical scenarios,
fables, parables, anecdotes, stories, incidents, dreams, legends and
myths, and narrative in general, for the sake of enhancing moral vision
or insight.26 More generally, Dancy points to the possibility of progress
21. Harman, supra note 3, at 44.
22. Michael Lagewing, Book Review, 55 PHIL. Q. 684, 685 (2005) (reviewing DANCY, supra
note 2).
23. For recent accounts of ethical intuitionism, see generally ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN
THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND INTRINSIC VALUE (2004) (discussing the history of
intuitionism and the principles that intuitionists believe define morality); ETHICAL INTUITIONISM:
RE-EVALUATIONS (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2002) (summarizing the various theories of
intuitionism); MICHAEL HUEMER, ETHICAL INTUITIONISM (2005) (exploring ethical intuitionism and
discussing various concepts important to the study of intuitionism); and Jeff McMahan, Moral
Intuition, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL THEORY 92, 92-95 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2000)
(describing the difference between moral intuition and moral theories).
24. See DANCY, supra note 2, at 156; Lagewing, supra note 22, at 685.
25. See DANCY,supra note 2, at 156; Lagewing, supra note 22, at 685.
26. See MCKEEVER & RIDGE, supra note 2, at 149; DAVID MCNAUGHTON, MORAL VISION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 204-05 (1988) (defending moral particularism). For the best-known
"dream" reference for our purposes, see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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toward agreement as each contending advocate "brings to bear other
situations that are both appropriately different from and also
appropriately similar to the one before them., 27 Doubtless the analogies,
hypothetical stories, and other techniques of feeding intuition should
strike us as relevant and somehow telling. But this does not prove that
all such devices must be logically dependent for their very
meaningfulness upon some broader principle.
However the idea of moral particularism is developed, is there any
reason to believe that there cannot be a legal decisionmaking analogue,
in the form of legal particularism? Is it not sometimes possible for
judges to rely crucially on some of the intuition-prompting techniques
cited above, including hypotheticals and analogies? 28 Certainly the basic
terminology of particularism can thus seem apt in discussing legal
29issues. So it is not surprising to find a philosopher encouraging us to
extend the inquiry into particularism from the moral realm into the legal
realm.3 °
Admittedly, it has sometimes been argued that legal analogies do
not select and prioritize themselves, and that "to identify what count as
relevant similarities and when two cases are sufficiently similar we must
rely on something else, presumably a prior general rule., 31 But not all
27. Dancy, supra note 2. In the specifically legal context, see, for example, Emily Sherwin, A
Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1186-96 (1999) (justifying the
use of analogical reasoning by judges in the decisionmaking process) and Cass R. Sunstein, On
Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 749-59 (1993) (comparing analogical reasoning to
other theories used in the legal field). For reference to Dancy on narratives, see Timothy Chappell,
Jonathan Dancy: Ethics without Principles, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV., July 9, 2005, available at
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=3161 (book review).
28. See, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 27, at 1187-89; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 759; see also
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 31 (1921) (providing a classic
treatment); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 5 (1949) (same); LLOYD L.
WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 65-122 (2005) (providing
a contemporary treatment).
29. See, for the use of the term "particularism" in one sense or another in legal contexts,
Schauer, Rules, supra note 1, at 646 ("[M]any existing and justifiable forms of legal decisionmaking
are more particularistic than rule-based" but "rule-based decisionmaking, just like particularistic
decisionmaking, has a place in any plausible account of what law is."). Professor Schauer goes on to
raise the possibility of "rule-sensitive particularism." Id. at 649-50; see also Schauer, Perils of
Particularism, supra note 1, at 398 (choosing between an interpretation of Kalven's scholarship in
free speech law as either narrow-gauge, case-specific particularism, or grand theories and large
categories).
30. See Maria Cristina Redondo, Legal Reasons: Between Universalism and Particularism, 2
J. MORAL PHIL. 47, 58 (2005).
31. Danny Priel, Book Review, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 579, 581 (2007) (reviewing WEINREB,
supra note 28); see also Richard A. Posner, Reasoning by Analogy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 765
(2006) (reviewing WEINREB, supra note 28) ("One always requires a general understanding of some
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use of analogy, and of every other technique priming a particularist
judicial intuition, or the intuition itself, must be based on some principle,
rule, or policy. We will instead be arguing for a typically symbiotic
relationship in the law between particularism and principle, with the
persuasive force of a legal argument sometimes exceeding that of the
sum total of the particularist and principlist contributions.
Consider that many judicial outcomes rest on an assessment by a
judge, or by independently-reflecting jurors, on the credibility of one or
more witnesses or one or more items of testimony.32 It seems
questionable that all such intuitive determinations could be reduced
entirely to one or more mutually consistent rules. It seems even more
questionable that all of the decisionmakers would be able to articulate
such rule or rules after the fact, let alone claim to have taken such a rule
or rules as the sole basis of their decisionmaking. Even if so, such a rule
or rules may not supply all of the persuasive force of the judicial
outcome, even if it embodies all of the judicial outcome's logic. Riveting
witness testimony, and its persuasive if not its purely logical force, may
not always be reducible entirely to principle.
Or suppose, classically, that a judge is confronted with two women
who each claim to be the mother of a particular child, in an era without
DNA testing technology. Only one of the putative mothers appears
willing to sacrifice her claim if necessary to promote the basic interests
of the child. The judge, emotionally moved, awards custody of the child
to that claimant.
Now, it seems easy enough to devise a principle, or several
alternative principles, to account for the judge's decision. But for our
purposes, it is still of interest if the judge honestly tells us that the
decision was taken without conscious recourse to rule or principle, even
if a full justification of the decision would require some such recourse.
Or suppose the judge, at the time of drafting the official case
report,33 actually consciously considered some principle, whether
flawlessly formulated or not. Would it still not be possible that this"covering" principle was experienced by the judge as cold, distant,
abstract, and unmotivating in this case, however useful the principle
might be for logically justifying the decision to the public? Perhaps the
intuitive, inarticulable, emotionally-affecting experience of one woman
sort in order to determine relevant similarities. In a legal case it is an understanding of rules,
principles, doctrines, and policies. It is they that do the work in reasoning by analogy.").
32. See Ann Bowen Poulin, Credibility: A Fair Subject for Expert Testimony?, 59 FLA. L.
REv. 991, 1001 (2007).
33. Credit for this hypothetical goes to 1 Kings 3:16-28.
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sacrificing her claim was actually far more motivating, and in that sense
more explanatory, of the judicial result than any articulable principle.
The judge could thus have endorsed some principle-perhaps
something like: "In an otherwise close case, give custody to the claimant
who alone seems willing to make great sacrifices for the basic well-
being of the child." Some such principle, thus articulated, can sometimes
itself be deeply moving, and powerfully motivating,34 but need not be. A
judge and a public might candidly admit to being far more moved by the
story or the testimonial experience itself, at the level of particularist
intuition, than by any covering principles at a more general or abstract
level. The principle might, in a given case, leave everyone cold. And for
many legal purposes, this might well be important.
Someone might still be troubled, though, by an attempt to map
moral particularism onto the legal landscape. Many leading
contemporary jurisprudes seem to subscribe to one variety or another of
what is called legal positivism.35 Does legal positivism pose a serious
obstacle to transposing moral particularism, in some fashion, onto the
legal landscape?
We can hardly think so. Let us take legal positivism36 to require
some sort of separation between law and morals, such that the existence
of a law or legal system is independent of any moral quality thereof, or
at least from any moral quality not embodied in the social institutions
that generate the law. Of course, constitutional law may refer to
reasonableness,37 to cruelty,38 to due process, 39 and to equal protection,40
34. Consider, perhaps, the Kantian injunction to "use humanity, whether in your own person
or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785).
35. See generally MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT
TRIMMINGS (1999) (an overview of the arguments in favor of legal positivism); W. J. WALUCHOW,
INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994) (a defense of legal positivism and the theories it
incorporates); Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982)
(distinguishing between different forms of legal positivism).
36. See sources cited supra note 35.
37. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 (1989) ("The Fourth Amendment inquiry
is one of 'objective reasonableness' under the circumstances, and subjective concepts like 'malice'
and 'sadism' have no proper place in that inquiry.").
38. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) ("What constitutes a cruel
and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided. It has been said that ordinarily the terms
imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like.").
39. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) ("[T]he freedom of the State in
establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the requirement
of due process of law.").
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so the separation between law and morals may in some respects be
tenuous.
In any event, we have instances in which a judge can legitimately
take something like "evolving standards of decency, ''41 or "fundamental
fairness,, 42 or the "collective conscience ' '43 of the public, or a "shocks
the conscience" 44 standard directly into account in deciding cases. There
seems all the room necessary for morality and moral particulars even in
a landscape of legal positivism. But we need not, for our purposes, insist
on anything like even this. Our interest is mostly in how the
particularism itself in moral particularism translates into the legal realm,
with or without retaining the moral element of moral particularism. An
enhanced understanding of particularism and principlism in the laws can
draw, as we will see below, from the merely particularist, as distinct
from the specifically moral, dimension of moral particularism.
III. COMPARING PARTICULARISM AND PRINCIPLISM:
SOME INCONCLUSIVE SKIRMISHES
We can at this point consider more fully the roles and relationships
in which moral and legal particularism and principlism may engage. We
shall first see contrasts, and then some important symbiosis, before we
reach any ultimate accounting. But we should first ensure the levelness
of the playing field. We have referred above to particularism as typically
involving some form of intuition.45 We shall also refer briefly to the idea
of intuitionism in our concluding section.46 For now, though, it is
important to avoid improperly biasing the comparisons below.
40. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause was
intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental constitutional
premises.").
41. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008). This standard was
enunciated in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (The Eighth Amendment
"draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.").
42. See, e.g., Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 460 (2001) ("[T]he Due Process and Ex
Post Facto Clauses safeguard common interests-in particular, the interests in fundamental
fairness....").
43. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (arguing that, in determining which
rights are fundamental, judges should look to the collective conscience of the people).
44. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (citing Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)) (explaining that, in Rochin, the Court found "the forced
pumping of a suspect's stomach enough to offend due process as conduct that 'shocks the
conscience').
45. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
46. See infra Part V.
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Particularism is indeed typically dependent upon the exercise of
intuition. But not all intuitions, to be fair, are particularist intuitions.
Some intuitions are intuitions of broader principle.
Or at least so some intuitionists have argued. There are thus
particularist intuitionists, and principlist intuitionists. Among modem
intuitionists, consider, for example, the particularist intuitionism of
Professor E.F. Carritt: "I morally apprehend that I ought now to do this
act and then intellectually generalize rules. 47 More elaborately, "no
number of moral rules will save us from exercising intuition; for a rule
can only be general, but an act must be particular, so it will always be
necessary to satisfy ourselves that an act comes under the rule, and for
this no rule can be given."48 Professor H.A. Prichard concurred,49 and
argued that "[t]he sole value of formulating the principle is that it brings
out.., just that feature of the act which constitutes it an obligation." 50
Thus, there are some intuitionists who emphasize the particular.
Intuitionists have not always been clear on the respective roles of
particularized intuitions and of more general principlist intuitions.5 1 But
some leading modem intuitionists, such as Sir David Ross, have clearly
emphasized the decisive role of principlist intuitions. Ross argued that
"[o]ur judgments about our actual duty in concrete situations have none
of the certainty that attaches to our recognition of the general principles
of duty." 52
For Ross, principlist intuitions, despite their importance, only
gradually come to be self-evident to us, through accumulated experience
and reflection. Thus "[w]e find by experience that this couple of matches
and that couple make four matches ... and by reflection on these and
similar discoveries we come to see that it is the nature of two and two to
make four., 53 And in the moral realm, Henry Sidgwick maintained that
"[t]here are certain absolute practical principles, the truth of which,
47. E.F. CARRITT, THE THEORY OF MORALS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
116 (1928).
48. Id. at 114.
49. See H.A. PRICHARD, MORAL WRITINGS 5 (Jim MacAdam ed., 2002) ("We first recognize
the particular obligation and then by reflecting on it discover the principle .... ).
50. Id.; see also C.D. BROAD, FIVE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY 282 (7th impression 1956)
("Reason needs to meet with concrete instances of fitting or unfitting intentions and emotions before
it can rise, by Intuitive Induction, to the insight that any such intention or emotion would necessarily
be fitting (or unfitting) in any such situation.").
51. See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 103 (7th ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1981)
(1907).
52. W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 30 (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2002) (1930).
53. Id. at 32-33.
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when they are explicitly stated, is manifest., 54 The problem, according to
Sidgwick, is that such principles "are of too abstract a nature, and too
universal in their scope, to enable us to ascertain by immediate
application of them what we ought to do in any particular case;
particular duties have still to be determined by some other method., 55
We might then wonder about the character of our own moral
intuitions. Suppose, for example, that we came upon a group of children
inflicting gratuitous pain on an animal. If we have an intuition of moral
wrongness, does the intuition seem to be of the wrongness of the
particular act before us, or more broadly of the wrongness of the general
kind of act, at the level of principle? We can leave this question
unresolved, however. All we need is that the idea of intuition itself does
not seem unfairly biased as between particularism and principlism.
As we examine particularism and principlism on a level playing
field, their contrasts, interactions, and dependencies quickly begin to
emerge. It is often taken for granted, to begin with, that in the words of
Justice Holmes, "[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases.' 56
This would suggest a need for crucially supplementing general rules or
principles, in concrete application, as Holmes' contemporary Henry
Sidgwick was arguing in the realm of ethics.5 7
Justice Felix Frankfurter later complicated Justice Holmes' famous
but terse observation. According to Justice Frankfurter, whether general
propositions decide concrete cases "often depends on the strength of the
conviction with which such 'general propositions' are held., 58 Suppose
we have a case of first impression in which we must decide whether
racial segregation in the use of Twenty-Fourth Century public
transporter facilities is permissible. Can we really say that the
particularities of future transporter technology are likely to make a
significant difference? Is the vagueness of general rules really significant
here? Doesn't the general proposition do the crucial work even in this
more specific case?
On the other hand, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged with Justice
Holmes that "the impact of an immediate situation may lead to deviation
from the principle.,, 59 As particularists point out, neither morality nor our
54. See SIDGWICK, supra note 51, at 379.
55. Id.
56. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
57. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
58. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 157 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled
by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
59. Id.
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common law is strictly codifiable.6° Judge Richard Posner elaborates
upon Justice Holmes by observing that "[j]udges expect their
pronunciamentos to be read in context., 61 This tends to promote the role
of legal particularism. As a further complication, a general proposition is
sometimes subordinated not to another principle at the same level of
generality, but to an even more general principle.62
There thus seems to be no consensus on the priority of either
general rules or particular judgments that can be drawn from Justice
Holmes' observation on general propositions and the case commentary
thereon. Nor does the idea of the holding or the ratio decidendi6 3 of a
case offer us any uncontroversial resolution of the conflicts between
particularism and principlism in the law. It is at best unclear that
interesting reported legal cases have determinate holdings, at least at the
time of decision.64
60. The uncodifiability of law and of morality is recognized, without conceding the truth of
particularism, in Raz supra note 19, at 118 and Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 11, at 8. For the
problems of excessive attempts at codification, see DANCY, supra note 2, at 11-12.
61. Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 2005). Judge Posner may here be
endorsing, at most, some sort of context-bound principlism; but reading him in this way may itself
inadequately respect the narrow contextual purposes and limits of Judge Posner's language.
62. See Gallagher v. Gallagher, 212 P.2d 746, 750 (Or. 1949) ("[G]eneral rules frequently do
not decide specific cases. Moreover, all rules of the kind just mentioned must yield to the
one.., that the welfare of the child is of supreme importance.").
63. The debate over the nature and determining of the necessary rule or justification of a case
is a longstanding one. See generally A.L. Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L.
REV. 117 (1959) (clarifying the idea that the ratio decidendi is gleaned from a judge's conclusions
of the material facts of a case); A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L. REV.
453 (1959) (arguing that there are serious flaws in Goodhart's theory of the ratio decidendi of a
case).
64. As a high profile example, consider the ongoing debate over both the scope of and the
precise constitutional test adopted in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), in which the
Court found that, under the specific facts of the case, two consenting adults in the privacy of their
home are protected by the right to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See, e.g., Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008) ("But
nowhere in Lawrence does the Court describe the right at issue in that case as a fundamental right or
fundamental liberty interest. It instead applied rational basis review to the law and found it
lacking."); Witt v. Dep't of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 813-18 (9th Cir. 2008) (summarizing the
holding of Lawrence and concluding that the Court did not actually apply a rational basis analysis in
deciding the case); Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 48-56 (1st Cir. 2008) (collecting useful authorities
related to Lawrence). Another pertinent example may be made of the status of Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that a state's prohibition on assisted suicide does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment) after Lawrence. See generally, Symposium, Can Glucksberg
survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life and Personal Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1453 (2008) (collecting the thoughts of scholars such as Erwin Chemerinsky, Yale Kamisar, and
Steven D. Smith on the future viability of Glucksberg after the Court's decision in Lawrence). In a
different way, the scope of the holding of the admittedly unusual alienage education case of Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227-30 (1982), affirming the right of undocumented children to public
education, remains murky. See generally Maria L. Ontiveros & Joshua R. Drexler, The Thirteenth
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Nor is it clear that case holdings should be construed narrowly or
broadly, independent of context. The classical judicial defense of
narrowness, modesty, and avoidance of unnecessarily broad judicial
pronouncements is Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority.65 Ashwander narrowness, however, is
unfortunately largely irrelevant to our present concerns. The multiple
dimensions of Ashwander narrowness and avoidance actually cut across
our concern for particularism and principlism in the law. Ashwander
narrowness often operates merely to help a court choose between
principlist approaches, and not to choose, say, a particularist approach
over any principlist approach.66 If Ashwander tells us, for example, to
decide a case on statutory grounds without reaching some presumably
67broader constitutional issue, we may in either case still be opting for a
principlist, as opposed to a particularist, approach. And it is possible that
the avoided constitutional principle might in some sense have been
narrower or less controversial than the broad particularist vision
underlying, say, an important civil rights statute that is used to decide
the case.
A similar situation exists with respect to the related "judicial
minimalism" discussed by Professor Cass Sunstein.68 Minimalism in this
sense involves a judicial preference for narrowness or fact-attunement in
judicial rulings. 69 Judicial minimalism will often not be preferable to
broader, more general rules, especially if we factor in losses in legal
transparency, legal guidance, legal predictability, and even equality
when following minimalism in inappropriate contexts.
Amendment and Access to Education for Children of Undocumented Workers: A New Look at Plyler
v. Doe, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 1045 (2008) (observing that the holding of Plyler is doctrinally shaky,
suffers from problems of local law enforcement, and may fare better under a Thirteenth Amendment
analysis).
65. 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Frederick Schauer,
Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 71, 83, 89 (noting the significant costs of Ashwander's
straining for narrowness and issue avoidance).
66. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 347-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
67. See id.
68. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MNIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 9-23 (1999) (describing judicial minimalism and minimalists' tendency to make
judicial decisions based on the facts of a case rather than a general rule); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean
Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 362-86 (2006) (summarizing minimalism and describing key
arguments for and against Burkean minimalism, which is summarized as a preference for
incrementally constructed constitutional principles with deference to established traditions).
Incidentally, we think of Edmund Burke as distrusting broad, abstract political and moral
systemization, as in Jeremy Bentham, more than consistently resisting any recourse to principle.
69. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 68, at 10-11; Sunstein, supra note 68, at 362; Sunstein, supra
note 13, at 1907-08.
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As with Ashwander narrowness, 70 however, the problem from our
standpoint is the crosscutting between the categories of minimalism and
non-minimalism on the one hand and particularism and principlism on
the other. The minimalist may take a narrower principle to be preferable,
rightly or wrongly, to a broader principle. 7' But, again, each of the
minimalist legal principles, rules, or standards, along with their broader
counterparts, embody a principle in our sense, and thus a principlist is
distinct from a particularist approach to the judicial decision. And it is
also possible that a vivid particularist vision or image, as in a civil rights
context, might inspire and motivate exceptionally broad legal change.
Legal particularism is sometimes targeted, however, by a different
sort of critique. The critique in question, briefly put, is that principles
operate as a useful constraint on "the all too familiar tendency to engage
in special pleading and rationalization" 72 on behalf one's own, or a
favored group's, interests. Otherwise put, "with particularism as a
decision procedure, people would persuade themselves that what they
wanted to do was, in the particular circumstances, morally allowed., 73
However appealing some may take this critique to be, it seems the sort
of critique which ought to be alert for empirical evidence where
available.
One problem with this critique of particularism is that any principle
that is sensitive enough to be generally appealing may, in its sensitivity
to circumstances, also be vulnerable to manipulation in favor of self or
favored groups. 74 And one person's consistently principled judge may be
another person's merely ideologically-biased judge. A judge who
minimizes principle in favor of particularized intuition could at the same
time also display rigidity, and not just capriciousness.7 5 In any event,
even if either particularism or principlism has some overall advantage in
this regard, it seems that neither has a monopoly as an instrument of
judicial self-indulgence. In the meantime, without real evidence, it is not
clear that particularism is really more vulnerable to self-interested
manipulation.
It might then be tempting to try to score points for either legal
particularism or legal principlism by linking one approach to any
70. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
72. MCKEEVER & RIDGE, supra note 2, at 199.
73. Brad Hooker, Moral Particularism and the Real World, in CHALLENGING MORAL
PARTICULARISM, supra note 2, at 12, 27; see SIDGWICK, supra note 51, at 214; Chappell, supra note
27.
74. MCKEEVER & RIDGE, supra note 2, at 199.
75. See id. at 207.
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advantages of either facial or else as-applied challenges in the law.76 The
initial hope might be that as-applied challenges, as assumedly narrower
than facial challenges,77 might link up usefully with the more
particularist forms of legal decisionmaking.
But even if we set aside all the complications, we are ultimately left
with no consistent linkages between facial challenges and principlist
adjudication, or between as-applied challenges and particularist
adjudication. The most obvious problem here is that we can easily
imagine a broad statute being struck down facially, in its entirety, not on
grounds of principle, but on visionary, intuitive, narrativist, romantic, or
imagistic grounds apart from principle. And in contrast, we can even
more easily imagine a particular application of a statute as applied being
struck down as violating some remarkably broad principle or rule.78
A more interesting possibility, though, involves the idea that some
or all principles controversially claim absoluteness or exceptionless
universality within their proper scope of applicability. We find related
disputes over whether any particular moral or legal consideration could
count in favor of one outcome in some contexts, but against that same
outcome in other contexts. The idea is that if some single consideration,
such as wealth maximization or increasing pleasure, counts in favor of
an outcome in some contexts, but against that outcome in other contexts,
this change in the "polarity" of that consideration might impeach the
whole idea of principled decisionmaking.
Thus it is said, first, that "the question whether universal,
exceptionless moral principles govern morality.., lies at the heart of the
debate between particularism and generalism. '7 9 And it is then argued
that some consequence or "feature that is a reason in one case may be no
76. For discussions illustrating the murkiness and unsettledness of the distinction, see
Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996) (mem.) (Stevens, J.) (denying
certiorari); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 294 (1994); and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1336-37 (2000).
77. See, e.g., Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir.
2007); McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F.3d 45, 61 (1 st Cir. 2004).
78. Consider a public school district rule prohibiting the wearing of hats-typically, baseball
caps-in class. Swept up in the dragnet is perhaps a single individual who wears what is within the
definition of "hat," as a matter of a binding and well-recognized religious requirement. We can
imagine a judge striking down the rule only as thus applied, but on majestically broadly principled
grounds, referring crucially to the free exercise of religion, liberty of conscience, respect for the
most fundamental commitments of the individual, and such.
79. Vojko Strahovnik, Introduction: Challenging Moral Particularism, in CHALLENGING
MORAL PARTICULARISM, supra note 2, at 1, 1.
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reason at all, or even an opposite reason, in another." 80 But the most
reasonable view of such matters, it turns out, leaves sensible versions of
both particularism and principlism on the table in both moral and legal
contexts. No clear advantage for particularism or principlism in the law
seems evident here.
It is thus certainly common enough for moral philosophers81 and
legal decisionmakers 82 to refer to universal rules. But it is not always
clear how much support there is for the idea of genuinely universal and
exceptionless moral83 or legal 84 rules. Thomas Aquinas classically
observed that "although there is necessity in the general principles [of
the natural law], the more we descend to matters of detail, the more
frequently we encounter defects. 85 Some leading writers have endorsed,
for example, even the intentional targeting of innocents in cases of
genuine "supreme emergency." 86
The principlist thus may or may not wish to concede "the
particularist point that we can always find an exception to any moral
principle." 87 Consider, for example, one possible universal rule: that
80. DANCY, supra note 2, at 7.
81. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION, AND TRUTH 2 (1991);
IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 203 (Peter Heath trans., Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind
eds., 1997) ("Whoever may have told me a lie, I do him no wrong if I lie to him in return, but I
violate the right of mankind; for I have acted contrary to the condition, and the means, under which
a society of men can come about, and thus contrary to the right of humanity."); Brad Hooker, Moral
Particularism: Wrong and Bad, in MORAL PARTICULARISM, supra note 2, at 1, 8 ("[G]eneralists are
right to say that at least all non-sadistic pleasure is a moral plus."); cf. VICTOR HUGO, THE
HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME 228-31 (Walter J. Cobb trans., 1965) (narratively illustrating the
negative "polarity" of the crowd's sadistic pleasure).
82. See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 452 F.3d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir.
2006) (Barkett, J., dissenting) ("[lit is clear that there exists a universal, definable, and obligatory
prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment .... ).
83. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 81, at 204 ("But if, in all cases, we were to remain faithful to
every detail of the truth, we might expose ourselves to the wickedness of others, who wanted to
abuse our truthfulness."); ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 87-88 (1999); see also
G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 204 (Thomas Baldwin ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (1903)
("We can secure no title to assert that obedience to such commands as 'Thou shalt not lie' . . . is
universally better than the alternative[] of lying ....").
84. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[Ilt is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances."
(quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)); cf Hudson County Water Co.
v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) ("All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their
logical extreme.").
85. THOMAS AQUINAS, I SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I-Il, q. 94, art. 4, at 1011 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province, trans., Benzinger Bros., Inc. 1947).
86. See Michael Walzer, World War 1H: Why Was This War Different?, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3,
18-19 (1971). For discussion, see R. George Wright, Combating Civilian Casualties: Rules and
Balancing in the Developing Law of War, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 129, 158-68 (2003).
87. Richard Holton, Principles and Particularisms, 76 ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 191, 207 (2002).
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judges should seek to be impartial. Judges should strive for neutrality,
but judges might also strive to be friends of the outcast. Or a more
humble example: Desire and ambition in a job candidate seem positive
qualities, except when they are not. Or else: Is even slavery really a
matter of utterly exceptionless, universal rules? What then is the moral
status of buying slaves, if the buyer thereby immediately and
deliberately brings an end to the entire practice of slavery? Each of these
cases may arguably amount to an exception to a principle of one sort or
another. And in each, the moral "polarity" of the act or quality may seem
to "reverse" with the exception.
What does seem clear, though, is that the moral and legal principles
discussed above can still be genuine principles, of distinctive value in
moral and legal decisionmaking, even if they involve exceptions. 88
Suppose we do accept the "supreme emergency" exception to the rule
against the intentional military targeting of civilians. 89 But let us suppose
as well that every military combatant scrupulously observed what
remained of the rule, in all non-supreme emergency circumstances.
Would we not think of the remaining rule as not only a broad genuine
rule, or principle, but as of great theoretical and practical importance as
such?
As well, under those assumed circumstances, would we find the
limited reversal of moral or legal 'polarity' to really undermine the
usefulness of the very idea of a rule or principle?90 Suppose we
somehow determined that in a truly exceptional instance, deliberately
inflicting a civilian casualty could be morally or legally justified. Could
that justification itself not be a genuinely principled, if complex, "all
things considered" justification? Would we not still want to say that
even if deliberately inflicting that civilian casualty was permissible, it
was in such a case nonetheless deeply regrettable? Could we not still
think of intending civil casualties as generally prima facie 91 morally and
legally wrong?
More generally, then, the exceptions to moral and legal principles,
and the variable moral and legal significance of some considerations
88. See Mark Norris Lance & Maggie Little, From Particularism to Defeasibility in Ethics, in
CHALLENGING MORAL PARTICULARISM, supra note 2, at 53, 54 (referring to the "widespread
assumption that generalizations must be exceptionless if they are to do genuine and fundamental
theoretical work...").
89. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
90. For discussion, see David Bakhurst, Ethical Particularism in Context, in MORAL
PARTICULARISM, supra note 2, at 157, 170 and Hooker, supra note 81, at 10.




under different circumstances, do not even begin to decide the debate
between principlism and particularism in favor of the latter.
IV. THE ROLES OF PRINCIPLE AND THE PARTICULAR:
DISTINCTION AND SYMBIOSIS
A. Distinction and Symbiosis in General
Decisionmaking is often said to begin with the particular.9 2 As the
philosopher John McDowell puts it, "one knows what to do, if one does,
not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of
person: one who sees a situation in a certain distinctive way. 93 In the
legal realm, Justice Cardozo wrote that the common law "method is
inductive, and it draws its generalizations from particulars., 94 From the
legal particulars, though, a legal principle that unifies and rationalizes
the particulars then tends to arise and press itself forward.95 In fact,
while Justice Cardozo himself may begin with the particular, in the end
he sees the law as striving for something like the universalism of
Immanuel Kant. 96
92. See, e.g., id. at 32; Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JuRIS. 65, 98 (2006)
("Virtue ethics is famous for embracing 'particularism'-the notion that judgments about particular
cases take priority over abstract principles."). Of course, virtue itself could easily involve acting
courageously, honestly, or prudently, consistently and in all contexts, despite temptations and
disincentives. But see Hooker, supra note 73, at 23 ("1 flatly deny that moral knowledge always
does start off with judgments about particular cases.").
93. John McDowell, Virtue and Reason, in VIRTUE ETHICS 141, 162 (Roger Crisp & Michael
Slote eds., 1997). Again, though, as the example of honesty or truth-telling illustrates well, the
exercise of a moral virtue may be difficult to distinguish in practice from faithful, consistent
adherence to principle. See KANT, supra note 81, at 204. In the legal realm, see the discussion of
Frank Michelman's particularism in Gerald Dworkin, Philosophy, Law, and Politics, 72 IOWA L.
REv. 1355, 1356-57 (1987).
94. CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 23.
95. See id. at 31; cf FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153-54 (1960)
(arguing that law must in some sense be general and impersonal); see also Dworkin, supra note 93,
at 1357 (asserting that principles have a role in the law where judges must give public reasons for
their decisions).
96. For case references to Cardozo's dedication to Kantian universalism, see, for example:
Finwall v. City of Chicago, 239 F.R.D. 494, 503-04 (N.D. III. 2006); Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v.
Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1046, 1051 (Colo. 1983) (Rovira, J., dissenting) ("[The judge] is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles.") (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 28, at 139-41); and Reiss
v. Financial Performance Corp., 279 A.D.2d 13, 23 (N.Y. App. Div, 2000) (Saxe, J., dissenting in
part), aff'd in part and modified in part, remitted by, certified question answered by 97 N.Y.2d 195
(2001). Of course, universalism in the law is tempered with equitable concerns tracing back to at
least Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 100 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., 2000);
Solum, supra note 92, at 99. Equity itself, however, crucially involves and depends upon clearly
recognized principles. See, e.g., Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 645 (1835) (referring to
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Universalism, however, then itself requires the tempering and
limitations of equity.97 But equity is in its own turn itself largely a matter
of principle. 98 Considering these various dizzying turns in the argument
gives us some idea of the reciprocal dependence between principlism
and particularism in the law.
The philosopher Martha Nussbaum, along with others,99 begins
with the "priority of the particular."' 00 Nussbaum argues, in a way that
suggests mutual dependence, 101  that "[t]he general is dark,
uncommunicative, if it is not realized in a concrete image .... In the end
the general is only as good as its role in the correct articulation of the
concrete."'' 0 2 But along with this apparent subordination of principle,
Professor Nussbaum argues that "a concrete image or description would
be inarticulate, in fact mad, if it contained no general terms."'0 3 Taken as
a whole, then, Professor Nussbaum's argument suggests a reciprocal
dependency between principle and particular.' 04
A reciprocal dependency between principle and particular would
not necessarily completely erase any claimed advantages of either
approach. It has been claimed, for example, that "[e]thical generality
facilitates the teaching of ethics to children, the guidance of moral
decisions, the justification of moral judgments, and the formulation of
laws and social policies."'0 5 Or one might again claim that "the adoption
of a principle raises the stakes in situations in which we might be
tempted to violate the principle knowingly, and can provide further
"the principles of equity"); Pettkus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834, 837 (Can.) ("The great
advantage of ancient principles of equity is their flexibility ...."); Thomas M. Franck & Dennis M.
Sughue, The International Role of Equity-as-Fairness, 81 GEO. L.J. 563, 563 (1993) (equity has
"come to represent a set of principles designed to critique the law and ensure fairness among
nations"). While law and equity are thus hardly respective synonyms for principle and particularism
in the broader law, the relationship between law and equity begins to suggest the mutual
dependence of principlism and particularism in the law.
97. See supra note 96; see also supra note 83 (noting Immanuel Kant's concessions on the
scope and status of lying).
98. See supra note 96. But see Redondo, supra note 30, at 67-68 (asserting the standard
assumption that particularism is especially associated with equity, at least in an informal sense).
99. See supra note 92.
100. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LovE's KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND
LITERATURE 93 (1990); see also Andrew Gleeson, Moral Particularism Reconfigured, 30 PHIL.
INVESTIGATIONS 363, 363 (2007) ("particular cases have priority over rules (or 'principles' ... )").
101. See Infra Part IV.B (discussing the mutually dependent interaction of principle and
particular in the context of the law of race).
102. NUSSBAUM, supra note 100, at 95.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 93-96.
105. Robert Audi, Ethical Generality and Moral Judgment, in CHALLENGING MORAL
PARTICULARISM, supra note 2, at 31, 31.
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motivation to act in accordance with the principle."'10 6 These claimed
advantages, if real, might hold even though principle and particular in
the law are crucially mutually dependent.
On the other hand, it has been claimed that principlism can be
vulnerable to decisionmaking that is insensitive, mechanical, 10 7 morally
blind,'0 8 or "rule fetishist."' 0 9 And it has also been observed,
disturbingly, that rules are expected to be obeyed in at least some cases
where the scope of the rule is either over-inclusive or under-inclusive of
the underlying justification or reason for the rule. 10 To the extent that
these considerations argue for particularism over principlism in the law,
they also might survive recognizing the mutual dependence of
particularism and principlism.
The choice between legal particularism and legal principlism must
take all such contrasting considerations somehow into account. But even
if we take any of the above claimed advantages to be real and
substantial, we must still put any such advantages in the context of the
mutual dependencies of legal particularism and principlism we have
begun to illustrate above.11 Ultimately, the mutual dependencies seem
more important and clearer than any of the asserted advantages. To more
fully appreciate the nature and importance of the symbiotic relationships
involved, we should consider the roles of particularism and principlism
in the obviously crucial context of the historical struggle against slavery,
segregation, and racial discrimination. In this context, we shall see the
symbiosis of particularism and principlism as particularly clear and
important.
B. Race and the American Legal Argument:
Universal Principles and Particular "Badges and Incidents"
One hint at the mutual interdependence of particularism and
principlism in this context lies in the fact that we can hardly imagine a
more particularized approach than through the remarkably concrete
106. MCKEEVER & RIDGE, supra note 2, at 205. For related discussion, see supra notes 72-75
and accompanying text.
107. See Gleeson, supra note 100, at 365.
108. See id.
109. See id. (defining "rule-fetishism"); Bakhurst, supra note 90, at 157, 169.
110. See Larry Alexander, Can Law Survive the Asymmetry of Authority?, 19 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 463, 465-77 (2000); Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1195-96 (1994); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 953, 996-1003 (1995) (proposing multi-factor balancing tests to avoid the simultaneous under-
inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness of rules).
111. See supra Part [V.A.
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image or analogy 2 of a "badge," as in the "badges and incidents"'1 13 of
slavery, while at the same time there can hardly be more clearly
principled language than that of the Thirteenth Amendment. 14 In this
crucial context, the techniques of legal particularism and principlism are
not simply rivals, but complementary techniques, generating a more
powerful effect jointly than either could generate alone.' 15
In fact, particularism and principlism in the campaign against racial
inequality occasionally involve an intertwining." 6 We see this, for
example, in the speeches and writing of Frederick Douglass. There is the
particularism of Douglass as he departs from England to join his
American brethren in seeking Emancipation: "I go to suffer with them;
to toil with them; to endure insult with them; to undergo outrage with
them; to lift up my voice in their behalf.... , But Douglass could also
focus his audience's attention on unmistakable, undiluted principle: "I
am for the 'immediate, unconditional, and universal' enfranchisement of
the black man, in every State in the Union."'"18
We might well think of the work of Douglass' contemporary,
Harriet Beecher Stowe, as the epitome of particularist moral and legal
argument. Uncle Tom's Cabin, immensely widely read since its
publication," 9 has been thought "the single most influential book in
112. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968); Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3,20 (1883).
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. XlII, § 1 ("[N]either slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall
exist within the United States ....").
115. Something of this can be drawn from William Wilberforce's belief that while the logic
and rhetoric of natural rights can be effective, vivid and detailed description of concrete abuses, in a
particularist fashion, can be even more motivating. See William Wilberforce, An Appeal to the
Religion, Justice, and Humanity of the Inhabitants of the British Empire, in Behalf of the Negro
Slaves of the West Indies, in SLAVERY IN THE WEST INDIES 1, 7-11 (Negro Univ. Press 1969)
(1823).
116. Intertwining and close juxtaposing of principle and particular are clearly different from
the middle ground possibilities referred to supra at text accompanying note 5.
117. See Frederick Douglass, Farewell Speech to the British People, at London Tavern,
London, Eng. (Mar. 30, 1847), in PHILIP S. FONER, THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS: EARLY YEARS 1817-1849, at 206, 232 (1950); see also Frederick Douglass, The Church
and Prejudice, Speech Delivered at the Plymouth Church Anti-Slavery Society (Dec. 1841), in
FONER, supra, at 103, 104 (discussing observations of racism in northern churches).
118. Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the
Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society in Boston (Apr. 1865), in PHILIP S. FONER, 4 THE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: RECONSTRUCTION AND AFTER 157, 158 (1955).
119. See Bryan F. LeBeau, "She Told the Story, and the Whole World Wept," 38 AM. Q. 668,
670 (1986) (book review).
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American history."' 20 In the words of the poet Paul Laurence Dunbar,
referring to Stowe, "[s]he told the story, and the whole world wept.' 121
And yet Stowe intersperses broad principle with particularist story-
telling. 122 Perhaps there is a clue to Stowe's reliance on both approaches
in her rhetorical question: "What is freedom to a nation, but freedom to
the individuals in it?' ' 123 This question itself seems to join principle and
particular. Stowe then moves immediately to the concrete and
particularist meaning of freedom for the character George Harris. 124 But
it should also not be entirely surprising that the work's original subtitle
was the utterly principlist-almost Kantian--"The Man That Was a
Thing."' 125
We also see something of a combination of particularist and
principlist strands in Justice Harlan's noted dissenting opinion in Plessy
v. Ferguson.126 Consider, for example, his image-based observation that
"[t]he destinies of the two races... are indissolubly linked together, and
the interests of both require that the common government of all shall not
permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law.' 127
There are some limited particularist elements as well in Brown v. Board
of Education,128 but Brown leaves us most distinctively with principlist
conclusions, such as that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal." 29
Perhaps the best known combination of particularism and
principlism, in the context of racial justice, is Reverend Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have a Dream" Speech, delivered on April 28,
120. Idat671.
121. Paul Laurence Dunbar, Harriet Beecher Stowe, CENTURY MAG., Nov. 1898, available at
http://www.iath.virginia.edu/utc/africam/afpo33at.htm; see also Alfred L. Brophy, Harriet Beecher
Stowe's Critique of Slave Law in Uncle Tom's Cabin, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 457, 504 (1995-96)
(characterizing the novel as "rechanneling existing emotions"); Robert S. Levine, Uncle Tom's
Cabin, in Frederick Douglass' Paper: An Analysis of Reception, 64 AM. LIT. 71, 74 (1992)
(suggesting that sympathy was the key concept Stowe used to promote social change).
122. See, for example, the discussion of freedom in particularized and principlist terms in
HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 440-41 (Barnes & Noble Classics 2003) (1852).
123. Id. at441.
124. Seeid.
125. See LeBeau, supra note 119, at 670. For a sense, as well, of the abolitionist William Lloyd
Garrison's combination of the particularist and the principlist, see William Lloyd Garrison, Speech
at Charleston, S.C. (Apr. 14, 1865), available at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk
/USASgarrison.htm.
126. 163 U.S. 537, 552, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
127. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560.
128. See 347 U.S. at 494 (positing permanent effects on "hearts and minds").
129. Id. at495.
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1963 at the Lincoln Memorial. 130 Along with explicit references to the
abstractions of "sacred obligation," democracy, gradualism, segregation,
and freedom,' 31 we also find concretizing language associated with each
abstraction. 132 And along with reference to specific geographic places, to
his own "four little children,"' 3 3 and to the central motif of the dream, 134
we find reference as well to the self-evident principlist truth "that all
men are created equal.' 35
Even this very brief tour of the American law, morality, and
rhetoric of slavery and racial inequality suggests an important
conclusion. The attempts we have surveyed above 36 to establish general
advantages and disadvantages of particularism and principlism in the
law are in their place important. But they do not provide any knock-
down arguments for exclusive reliance in the law on either approach.
Rather, the modest, limited, and often counterbalanced advantages of
each with respect to the other, where they genuinely exist, serve another
purpose. Such advantages and disadvantages help to establish the proper
roles that both particularism and principlism should play in the overall
scheme of legal decisionmaking. The relationship between particularism
and principlism in the legal system is thus symbiotic, and not
unstructured.
Our consideration of the language of race and racial reform clearly
illustrates the mutual dependency of particularist and principlist moral
and legal argument. If we take, say, only the particularism of that racial
reform argument, we do not match the power and scope of the argument
overall. Similarly, if we take only the principlism of the racial reform
argument, we again do not match the power and scope of the overall
argument. Even merely adding together, in some purely mechanical way,
the particularist and principlist strands does not yield the overall effect
of their joint deployment through memorable, moving, timeless
argument.
If someone insists, we can say that particularism is prior, in the
sense that as a matter of our own moral development, we tend to start
with the concrete. We learn the counting of particular matchsticks before
130. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Keynote Address at the March on Washington,
D.C., for Civil Rights (Aug. 28, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF






136. See supra Parts I.IV.
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we grasp the ideas of numbers and counting as a matter of abstract
principle. 137 But particularism and principlism both need each other.
Each, on its own, is not merely fallible, but potentially blind, or
insufficiently motivating. 138
There can of course be no guarantees of the power of either
approach, or both jointly. Neither the most vivid imagery, the most
compelling universalism, nor even their joint deployment, was able to
prevent the moral disagreement that, in part, underlay the American
Civil War. 139 We can be grossly insensitive to the concrete
circumstances before us, as well as to abstract principle. We are capable
of seeing cruelty and exploitation as easily defensible, and even as
needing no defense.
And on behalf of principlism, we can say that thinking of counting
as only a matter of particular matchsticks amounts to an
underdevelopment of the understanding. Similarly, there would be
something unfortunate about an entire culture that quite rightly found
first one person, and the next person, and then the third person, and so
on, to be unworthy of enslavement, but that had no ability to generalize
or abstract. A culture should be able to universalize, articulate, and be
motivated by the unfolding general pattern. In their own way, general
principles, stated as such, can be motivating, evocative, and even
inspiring on their own terms. 140 The motivational power of the particular
and of principle can, under the best circumstances, operate in something
like a stereoscopic fashion, adding a further and richer dimension to our
understanding and motivation.' 41
V. CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM OF CHOOSING TO EMPHASIZE EITHER
PARTICULARISM OR PRINCIPLISM
Can anything at all be said about how to recognize a legal system
that makes the most of the respective advantages-however debatable
they might be-of particularism and principlism, and their potential for
symbiosis as well? We will not attempt to press any further in this
137. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. In the general and moral realm, see JOSEPH
REIMER ET AL., PROMOTING MORAL GROWTH: FROM PIAGET TO KOHLBERG 29-32 (2d ed. 1990)
(discussing the "concrete operations" stage of Jean Piaget).
138. For further discussion, see the arguments formulated dramatically by Professor Martha
Nussbaum, supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 116-25 and accompanying text.
140. See supra text accompanying note 135, as further universalized.
141. As in Dr. King's "I Have A Dream" Speech, taken as a whole. See supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
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Conclusion than we already have in assessing the various claims of
advantage and disadvantage. We will assume a significant role for both
particularism and principlism in any worthy legal system, given their
respective limits and their symbiotic potential.
One way to approach this problem of choosing which approach to
emphasize would be to set before us two or more competing legal
systems. At least one of the competing legal systems would emphasize
particularism in some plausible way, and at least one would emphasize
principlism in some other plausible way. We could then try to mentally
take in as much of what we considered their respective advantages as we
could, as well as of the assumed importance of those advantages. Our
final judgment as between the more particularist legal system and the
more principlist legal system could then be left to some form of
intuition. 142
Of course, intuitions, especially of such complex matters, are not
infallible or immune to disagreement.143 Suppose different persons have
conflicting intuitions as to which legal system best recognizes the
advantages and disadvantages of particularism and principlism. This
would certainly not be a surprising outcome. If we do not want to leave
this dispute at the level of conflicting intuitions, one further alternative is
to apply what is called "coherentism" 144 in assessing the merits of
142. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text. We can have intuitions of an overall
comparison between two complex systems, as when someone decides where to vacation, where to
attend college, or where to live, based on some sort of examination-based intuition. For background
on contemporary intuitionism, see generally AUDI, supra note 23; HUEMER, supra note 23. For an
examination of intuition in the legal system, see generally R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition
in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381 (2006).
143. See, e.g., AUDI, supra note 23, at 2. Something analogous could of course be said of any
more substantive approach to this problem, including any of the multiple varieties of utilitarianism.
Which school of thought considered at a general level, does not then break down into competing
schools of thought, within that general overall framework?
144. For a mere suggestion of the large literature on coherence theories in several philosophical
contexts, see generally NICHOLAS RESCHER, THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH (Univ. Press of
Am. 1982) (1973); Laurence Bonjour, The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge, 30 PHIL.
STUDIES 281 (1976) (exploring and defending the coherence theory of empirical knowledge); Keith
Lehrer, The Coherence Theory of Knowledge, 14 PHIL. TOPICS 5 (1986) (an in-depth discussion of
the coherence theory of knowledge and the theory of justification); and Nicholas Rescher,
Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization, 71 J. PHIL. 695 (1974)
(comparing and contrasting coherentism to foundationalism). For discussions of coherentism in
specifically legal contexts, see R. George Wright, Two Models of Constitutional Adjudication, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 1357, 1379-82 (1991) and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism, 50 SMU L.
REV. 1679, 1705-07 (1997). Perhaps the best known specific version of coherentism is the interest
in wide "reflective equilibrium" in JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48 (1971); see also the
excellent treatment in Norman Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium. Professor Daniels may
assume that wide reflective equilibrium must take account of moral principles, but there seems no
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emphasizing particularism versus emphasizing principlism in a legal
system.
In our context, coherentism would focus not on any single intuition
supporting our overall evaluations of the competing legal systems, but
on how well or poorly those evaluations fit with all of our other beliefs.
Applying coherentism, we evaluate competing legal systems-whether
emphasizing or de-emphasizing particularism-as fitting more or less
well with a variety of other beliefs we hold at various levels.
Thus under coherentism, we ultimately ask whether our preference
for one possible legal system over another is supported well, or poorly,
by the web or "interlacing network" 145 of other beliefs we hold. Some of
those networking beliefs will be about the law, and others not. Of
course, some of our other beliefs are more relevant than others. A very
loose analogy is that we have confidence in a crossword puzzle answer
to the degree that our answer is supported by the sustaining network of
letters and words that are in turn supported by similar networking, and
also by our confidence in the answer's responsiveness to the clue.1 4 6 Or
we could say that our belief that Australia exists is supported not by
some single intuition or any foundational belief, but by an elaborate
network of many supporting beliefs of various kinds.
The choice between emphasizing particularism or principlism in the
law is thereby linked to a dense, multi-dimensional network of belief.
Merely for example, moral beliefs as to the status of both typical and
unusual cases may be implicated. If we believe that the law must usually
discount unusual cases that belief may cohere well with a more
principlist legal system. If, on the other hand, we believe that the law
should normally make every reasonable effort to accommodate unusual
cases that belief may cohere better with an emphasis on particularism.
How we prioritize avoiding self-indulgent judicial decisionmaking is
another consideration. Whether we think judges respond better to vivid
imagery than to abstract rules seems relevant as well. What we might
call the civic educational needs of the public, as we believe those needs
to be, will also seem relevant. Do people learn racial equality better
through vivid example, or through broad principle? More broadly,
whether we think of morality in general as owing more to principle than
reason why someone who rejected moral principles could not still apply coherentism, or something
like wide reflective equilibrium.
145. Rescher, supra note 144, at 699.
146. My analogy of the crossword puzzle is admittedly over-simplified. See SUSAN HAACK,
EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY 84-86 (1995); Nancey
Murphy, Truth, Relativism, and Crossword Puzzles, 24 ZYGON 299, 303-06 (1989).
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to the particular will be relevant, as will our beliefs about what motivates
us when we do the right thing. We will want our chosen legal system to
cohere well with our beliefs not only as to morality, but as to social
facts, including what best motivates us.
These complexities in applying coherentism are not, however, our
only problem. There are many possible forms of coherentism 1 47
Coherentism is really more of a family of possible approaches, each with
its own definitions, scope, values, priorities, and emphases.1 48 We
unfortunately cannot choose from among these possibilities merely by
asking what coherentism in general requires; 149 there is no coherentism
apart from how we may choose to flesh out the initial vague,
metaphorical idea. We thus might all choose different forms of
coherentism.
So if some persons try to use coherentism to decide between a legal
emphasis on particularism and a legal emphasis on principlism, there
will almost unavoidably be problems in reaching consensus. Minimally,
there might be "ties." The ties might be real ties, in the sense that, say,
two versions of particularism, or one version each of particularism and
principlism, are found to be equally coherent. More likely, though, we
would end up with, say, one legal system emphasizing particularism, and
another emphasizing principlism, each system with its defenders, but
where those defenders are relying on different versions of coherentism.
If, as seems likely, we cannot all agree on how to define and measure
coherence in all respects, coherentism alone cannot realistically offer to
determine a single best emphasis as between particularism and
principlism in the law.
We may thus be left with no generally acceptable way to choose the
right balance, or the proper scope, of particularism and principlism in the
law. Perhaps that is the best we can do. It is at this point, though, that the
intuitionist150 might re-enter the scene. There is nothing to stop an
intuitionist at this late stage from choosing, through intuition, precisely
from among the remaining candidates for the most overall coherent legal
system, with their different emphases on particularism and principlism.
An intuitionist might thus have an intuition as to which of the remaining
possible legal systems was most coherent.
Of course, we may choose not to follow the intuitionist here, or to
agree with the intuitionist's result. A certain level of dispute and
147. See Wright, supra note 142, at 1415-16.
148. Seeid. at l413.
149. Seeid. at 1415.
150. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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uncertainty here as well seems inevitable.1 51 But if we do follow the
intuitionist, at this highly abstract stage of the argument, we do, finally,
break the symmetry between particularism and principlism.' 52 The
intuitionist at this point is, after all, no longer assessing something vivid
and concrete like the mistreatment of an animal. In that context, there
can realistically be intuitions of principle as well as intuitive
particularized judgments.153 One might equally intuit either that this
specific behavior is wrong, or that abuse of animals in general is wrong.
But in our context, the intuitionist is now choosing between two
entire complex legal systems with different balances of particularism
and principlism. Some of us would have no clear intuition at all in such a
case. There are limits to our cognitive abilities. But of those who did, it
seems far more likely that the intuition involved would be a particular
intuitive judgment, although of large, complex, abstract legal systems,
rather than an intuitive judgment of much broader principle. 154
Such abstract skirmishing between particularist and principled
intuitions should not distract from the essential points recognized above.
Particularism and principlism in the law can and should contend for
advantage and priority, mostly without any clear resolution. However we
might choose to total up their respective advantages, far more important
is their mutual dependence and complementarities of role.
To the extent that judges are unfamiliar with or uncertain about a
legal matter, they may appreciate the opportunity to focus on the
concrete, the vivid, and the particular. In some respects, the particular
can also move us emotionally and motivate our efforts. 55 The particular
thus certainly has its place.
We may, on the other hand, be instructed and moved by articulated
principle as well. 156 And it would be odd to resolve a series of slavery
151. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at 4-5.
152. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text; see also Daniels, supra note 144 ("The
inquiry might be as specific as the moral question, 'What is the right thing to do in this
case?'... Alternatively, the inquiry might be much more general, asking which theory or account
ofjustice or right action we should accept .... ").
154. This seems mostly a matter of the realistic limits of human intuition, abstraction, and
experience. At some level of complexity and abstracting, we run out of intuitive principles running
far beyond the cases in our experience. This is not to suggest that we could not, for example, try to
calculate which of the contending legal systems maximized overall utility. A utilitarian could
certainly try to decide between our contending legal systems on utilitarian grounds. The point is
merely that complex utilitarian calculations do not generally qualify as intuitions, let alone as
intuitions at the level of principle.
155. See, most distinctively, supra Part IV.B.
156. See supra Part IV.B.
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cases mostly through a memory of how we have decided each of the
preceding slavery cases, individually and in turn. Principle also has its
vital role. At some point, it behooves us to recognize the broader
principle that no person can be an appropriate candidate for slavery. Our
motivation to carry that and similar principles forward in the law is at its
best and strongest when we are conscious of both the particularities and
the universalities of slavery and freedom. 157 Given who we are, the
particular and the principled in our legal system will crucially depend on
one another.
157. See supra Part IV.B.
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